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Culture Patterns and Judicial Systems
Stuart S. Nagel*
Comparative law, like comparative government in general,' has
largely confined itself to unintegrated descriptions of European legal
principles.2 Not only has comparative law traditionally been limited
in its subject matter, but it also has rarely, if ever, made use of statisti-
cal techniques in accounting for the differences observed. It is the
purpose of this paper to analyze statistically the relations between
industrialism, democracy, and collectivism on the one hand and the
judicial process on the other in ten different societies.
I. THE RESEARCH DFSIGN
It is hypothesized that statistically significant relations might be
found between the following cultural and adjudication characteristics:
I. Cultural Characteristics
1. Manufacturing versus non-manufacturing technology.
2. Mainly dictatorial versus mainly democratic political
system.




1. Presence of professional judges or dispute settlers.
2. Selection of judges mainly by chieftains versus selection
mainly by the people as a whole in the society.
3. Presence of jurors or lay advisers to professional judges.
4. Frequent presence of lawyers or professional pleaders.
B. Sources of Decision-Making Criteria
1. Presence of vigilantism or informal lay trials accompanied
by lynching, blood feuds, or other violence parallel to the
formal system.
2. Presence of supernatural divinations, ordeals, judicial
duels, effective supernatural oaths, or heavy reliance on
religious literature.
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3. Mainly rigid precedent following or norm following re-
sulting in considerable judicial restraint versus mainly
case individualization resulting in considerable judicial
discretion.
4. Presence of norms promulgated by councils or judges
versus norms stemming only from evolved custom.
C. Adjudication Purposes in Criminal Matters
1. Mainly defense oriented versus mainly prosecution ori-
ented.
2. Primary emphasis on rehabilitation of norm breakers
versus primary emphasis on making norm breakers suffer
to deter others or satisfy revengefulness.
D. Techniques Involved in Resolving Controversies
1. Mainly private suits for damages versus mainly public
or community handling of norm breakers.
2. Generally more than two months from settlement initia-
tion to completion versus generally less.
3. Presence of frequent provision whereby parties of high
classes or ethnic groups have greater chance of winning
than parties of low classes or ethnic groups.
4. Frequent or occasional bribery versus seldom if ever any
bribery.
5. Judges frequently summon and interrogate witnesses
versus system where judges seldom or just occasionally do
SO.
6. Presence of procedures whereby a losing party can gener-
ally apply for another hearing.
To test the hypotheses, ten societies were analyzed. Five of the
ten societies consisted of the following geographically scattered pre-
literate societies:
1. Ashanti Confederation as described in Robert Rattray, Ashanti
Law and Constitution (1929).
2. Cheyenne as described in Karl Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoe-
bel, The Cheyenne Way (1941).
3. Eskimo as described in Knud Rasmussen, Intellectual Culture
of the Iglulik Eskimo (1929).
4. Ifugao as described in Roy Barton, Ifugao Law (1919).
5. Trobriand as described in Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Cus-
tom in Savage Society (1926).
Secondary source material on these pre-literate societies is available
in E. Adamson Hoebel's The Law of Primitive Man (1954). The other
five societies consisted of the following geographically scattered liter-
ate societies:
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1. United States as described in Lewis Mayers, The American Legal
System (1955), and Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (1949).
2. Pre-Communist China as described in William Burdick, Bench
and Bar of Other Lands (1939), and John Wigmore, Panorama
of the World's Legal Systems (1936).
3. Pre-Nasser Egypt as described in the Burdick and Wigmore
works listed above.
4. French Fourth Republic as described in Robert Neumann, Euro-
pean and Comparative Government (1951), and Rene David,
The French Legal System (1958).
5. Soviet Union as described in Harold Berman, Justice in Russia
(1950).
Table 1 shows the cultural and adjudication characteristics of the
ten societies according to the sources consulted. The symbols used
in Table 1 are defined below the table. The selection of judges,
presence of jurors (lay advisers to judges), bribery of judges, and the
interrogatory role of judges are concepts inapplicable to the Trobriand
society in view of the fact that it lacks any personages who can be
considered judges, professional or otherwise. The presence of rehabili-
tation versus deterrence is also inapplicable to the Trobriand society
since the emphasis there is in neither direction, but rather in the
direction of handling norm breakers so as to provide compensation to
those who have suffered from the violation. The presence of judges
appointed by chieftains versus judges selected by the people as a
whole is inapplicable to the Ifugao society since the selector there is
the plaintiff, who picks whomever he wants to judge the dispute.
II. MANuFACrtuING AND NON-MANuFACtURING COMPAMIONS
Table 2 shows how the adjudication systems of the manufacturing
societies involved differ from those of the non-manufacturing societies.
The probabilities in the table represent how many times out of 100 a
difference as large as each difference found could have occurred purely
by chance, taking into consideration the size of each difference and
the number of societies involved.3 If the chance probability is less
than 5 out of 100, it is conventional to attribute the difference found
to a real difference rather than to chance. If the chance probability
is greater than 20 out of 100, it is conventional to attribute the dif-
ference to chance. A finding with a chance probability between 5
3. The Fisher exact probability test is the appropriate test of chance probability
to use on this data because it takes into consideration the smallness of the samples
and because the societies do not distribute themselves in a bell-shaped manner on the
characteristics being measured. See SFGEL, Nour~nrm =c STArsmsTcs FoR THE
BEHwionR.A Sc_ cFs 95-104 (1956). The probability of attributing each difference
found to chance has been doubled by virtue of the fact that the hypotheses did not
specify the direction of the difference. Id. at 13-14.
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TABLE I. THE CULTURAL AND ADJUDICATION CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE TEN SOCIETIES
0 P'=-. . o 04
(~0
L Cultural Characteristics
Manufacturing Y N N Y N N Y N Y N
Democratic Y E Y N N Y Y Y N N




Professional judges Y Y N Y Y N Y N Y N
Appointive judges N E Y Y Y N Y I N I
Jurors Y N N N N N Y N Y I
Lawyers Y Y N Y E N Y N Y N
B. Sources of Criteria
Vigilantism E N N N N Y N Y N Y
Supernaturalism N Y Y N Y Y N N N N
Little discretion Y N N N N Y Y N N E
Promulgation Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y N
C. Purposes
Defense oriented Y N Y N N E Y N N N
Rehabilitation E N Y N N Y N N Y I
D. Techniques
Private emphasis N N N Y N Y N Y N Y
Only short delays N Y Y N N N N Y Y Y
Discrimination Y. Y N -Y Y N E N N Y
Frequent bribery Y y N Y Y N N N N I
Adversary system Y N N N N N N N N I
Rehearings Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N
Symbols Used:
Y (yes) = has the mentioned characteristic to the extent specified in the hypothesis.
N (no) = has the obverse, characteristic to the extent specified in the hypothesis.
E - approximately evenly balanced between Y and N.
I - inapplicable in light of other characteristics of the society, (e.g., method of
judicial selection is a question inapplicable to a society which has neither
professional nor non-professional judges).
U = unrevealed in the sources consulted.
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and 20 out of 100 can be treated, where small samples
as being worthy of further consideration and analysis
worthy of acceptance as a proven relationship.
are involved,
although not
TABLE 2. HOW THE ADJUDICATION SYSTEMS OF MANUFACTURING SOCIETIES
DIFFER FROM THOSE OF NON-MANUFACTURING SOCIETIES
Number of % of Non- Differ-
Societies % of Mfg. Mtg. Sod- ence Probability of
Involved Societies eries Hay- (in per- the Difference
Adjudication (MEg. & Having the ing the centage Being Due to
Factor Non-Mg.) Ad!. Factor Adi. Factor points) Chance
A. Personnel
Professional judges 4 & 6 100% 33% +67 .05 to .20
Appointive judges 4 &3 50 67 -17 Above .20
Jurors 4&5 75 0 +75 .05 to .20
Lawyers 4 & 5 100 20 +80 .05 to .20
B. Sources of Criteria
Vigilantism 3&6 0 50 -50 Above.20
Supernaturalism 4 & 6 0 67 -67 .05 to .20
Little discretion 4 & 5 50 20 +30 Above .20
Promulgation 4 & 6 100 33 +67 .05 to .20
C. Purposes
Defense oriented 4 & 5 50 20 +30 Above .20
Rehabilitation 3 & 5 33 40 -07 Above .20
D. Techniques
Private emphasis 4 & 6 25 50 -25 Above .20
Only short delays 4 & 6 25 67 -42 Above .20
Discrimination 3 & 6 67 50 +17 Above .20
Frequent bribery 4 & 5 50 40 +10 Above .20
Adversary system 4 & 5 25 0 +25 'Above .20
Rehearings 4 & 6 100 33 +67 .05 to .20
In Table 2 there are no relationships which have a chance proba-
bility of less than 5 out of 100. There are, however, six relationships
which involve differences greater than 60 percentage points and
chance probabilities between .05 and .20 in spite of the small samples.
Thus Table 2 tends to show that manufacturing societies are more
likely than non-manufacturing societies to have adjudication systems
in which professional judges, jurors, lawyers, promulgating bodies,
and appellate courts are present and in which supernaturalism is
relatively absent. Table 3 shows the specific societies which illustrate
these relations, excluding those societies for which the positions used
are inapplicable or evenly balanced. The disproportionate presence
of professional judges, jurors, lawyers, promulgating bodies, and appel-
late courts among manufacturing societies can probably be partially
explained by the fact that increased industrialization brings increased
specialization within the economic system of a society which carries
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
over into the political and adjudicative systems. The relationships
can also be partially explained by the fact that increased industrializa-
tion better enables a society to have enough of an economic surplus
to be better able to support political and judicial officials who are not
directly producing food, shelter, or clothing for the society.
TABLE 3. THE SOCIETIES WHICH ILLUSTRATE THE MORE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
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The disproportionate presence in non-manufacturing societies of
divination, trial by ordeal, and judicially supervised duels (in all of
which divine intervention is presumed to enable the truth to win out)
can possibly be explained by the fact that with increased industrializa-
tion there comes a greater emphasis on materialistic explanation of
phenomena rather than on supernaturalistic explanation. Both in-
dustrialization and a naturalistic or materialistic orientation seem to
be co-effects of increased acquisition of knowledge and improved
scientific techniques in the physical and biological sciences.
TABLE 4. HOW THE ADJUDICATION SYSTEMS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES
DIFFER FROM THOSE OF DICTATORIAL SOCIETIES
Differ-
Number of % of Dem. % of Diet. ence Probability of
Societies Societies Societies (in per- the Difference
Adjudication Involved Having the Having the centage Being Due to
Factor (Dem. & Dit.) Adi. Factor Adj. Factor Points) Chance
A. Personnel
Professional judges 5 & 4 40% 75% -35 Above .20
Appointive judges 4 & 3 50 67 -17 Above .20
Jurors 5 & 3 40 33 +07 Above .20
Lawyers 5 & 3 40 67 -27 Above .20
B. Sources of Criteria
Vigilantism 4&4 50 25 +25 Above.20
Supernaturalism 5 & 4 40 25 +15 Above .20
Slightly
Little discretion 5 & 3 60 0 +60 above .20
Promulgation 5 & 4 60 75 -15 Above .20
C. Purposes
Defense oriented 4 & 4 75 0 +75 .05 to .20
Rehabilitation 4 & 3 50 33 +17 Above .20
D. Techniques
Private emphasis 5 & 4 40 50 -10 Above .20
Only short delays 5 & 4 40 50 -10 Above .20
Discrimination 4 & 4 25 75 -50 Above .20
Frequent bribery 5 & 3 20 67 -47 Above .20
Adversary system 5 & 3 20 0 +20 Above .20
Rehearings 5 & 4 40 75 -35 Above .20
III. DEmOCRATIC AND DIcTAToIAL ComPAiusoNs
Table 4 shows how the adjudication systems of democratic societies
differ from those of dictatorial societies. Two of the relationships
relating to defense orientation and judicial discretion are strong
enough to have chance probabilities almost below .20 in spite of the
small samples. The specific societies which illustrate these relations
are shown in Table 5. The democratic system emphasizes the im-
portance of the people sometimes at the expense of the state or the
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [VoL. 16
government. This factor possibly explains why democratic societies
tend to place numerous obstacles in the way of finding an accused
person guilty of violating the societal norms. In such societies, the
philosophy prevails that it is frequently better that no sanctions be
enforced at all for a violation of the norms of the collectivity than
have innocent people be swept up in the sanctions.
TABLE S. THE SOCIETIES WHICH ILLUSTRATE THE MORE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
FINDINGS WITH REGARD TO DEMOCRACY AS A DETERMINANT
OF ADJUDICATION SYSTEMS
Dictatorial Democratic Dictatorial Democratic
Defense Little
oriented American judicial American
Cheyenne discretion to Eskimo
French individualize French
Prosecution Much
oriented Chinese judicial Chinese CheyenneEgyptian Ifugao discretion to Egyptian Cfueao
Soviet individualize Soviet Ifugao
Trobriand
Table 4 also tends to show that societies with a democratic political
organization are more likely than societies with a dictatorial political
organization to have adjudication systems in which there is relatively
little judicial discretion. Just as the economic specialization which is
involved in industrialization carries over to a society's adjudication
system, the popular restraints on political chieftains which are in-
volved in democracy probably also carry over to a society's adjudica-
tion system. One of the major ways to prevent undue discretion on
the part of adjudicators is to require through tradition or law that
present adjudicators shall apply the rules of past adjudicators with-
out attempting to individualize decisions to the parties.
IV. COLLECTIVISTIC AND INDIVIDUALISTIC COMPAIISONS
Table 6 shows how the adjudication systems of societies which
emphasize collective ownership of property differ from those of
societies which emphasize individual ownership. Three of the rela-
tionships are below or nearly at the .20 level of chance probability.
Table 7 shows the specific societies which illustrate these relation-
ships. All of the societies which have a collectivistic property system
emphasize rehabilitation over revenge or deterrence in their criminal
proceedings, whereas none of the societies with an individualistic
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property system do so. This finding is possibly attributable to the
fact that in a collectivistically organized society each member tends
to feel more of a responsibility for each other member. Thus when
one member becomes a social deviant, there is more of a tendency
to blame the environment than to blame the individual. Furthermore,
in a collectivistically organized society there is a greater feeling of
unity and a lesser feeling of competitiveness. When a member of
such a society becomes a social deviant, this feeling of unity discour-
ages his being labeled an outlaw and encourages an attempt to bring
him back into the fold through rehabilitation.
TABLE 6. HOW THE ADJUDICATION SYSTEMS OF COLLECTIVISTIC SOCIETIES
DIFFER. FROM THOSE OF INDIVIDUALISTIC SOCIETIES
Differ-
Number of T of Col. T of Ind. ence Probability of
Societies Societies Societies (in per- the Difference
Adiudication nvolved Having the Having the centage Being Due to
Factor (Col. & Ind.) Adi. Factor Adi..Factor points) Chance
A. Personnel
Professional judges 3 & 6 33% 67% -34 Above.20
Appointive judges 3 & 4 33 75 -42 Above .20
Jurors 3 & 5 33 40 -07 Above .20
Lawyers 3 & 5 33 60 -27 Above .20
B. Sources of Criteria
Vigilantism. 3 & 5 33 40 -07 Above .20
Supernaturalism 3 & 6 67 17 +50 Above .20
Little discretion 3 & 5 33 40 -07 Above .20
Promulgation 3 & 6 67 67 0 No difference
C. Purposes
Defense oriented 2 & 6 50 33 +17 Above .20
Rehabilitation 3 & 4 100 0 +100 .05 to .20
D. Techniques
Private emphasis 3 & 6 33 50 -17 Above .20
Only short delays 3 & 6 67 33 +34 Above .20
Discrimination 3 &5 0 80 -80 .05 to .20
Slightly
Frequent bribery 3 & 5 0 60 -60 above .20
Adversary system 3 &5 0 20 -20 Above.20
Rehearings 3 & 6 33 67 1-34 Above .20
As shown in Table 6, collectivistic societies are less likely than
individualistic societies to have discrimination present in their adjudi-
cation system whereby members of higher classes or ethnic groups
have a better chance of winning an adjudication than others do.
This finding can possibly be explained by the fact that a collectivistic
society is less likely to have sharp property differentials on which
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TABLE 7. THE SOCIETIES WHICH ILLUSTRATE THE MORE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
FINDINGS WITH REGARD TO COLLECTIVISM AS A DETERMINANT OF
ADJUDICATION SYSTEMS
Individ- Collectiv- Individ- Collectiv-

















economic classes can be based. In addition, the greater feeling of
unity and cooperation which tends to exist within collectivistic so-
cieties tends to discourage categorizing people for purposes of un-
equal treatment.
A third finding which Table 6 tends to reveal is the greater
presence of bribery of adjudicators in societies with an individualistic
rather than a collectivistic property system. The explanation possibly
lies in the fact that there is greater competition for material acquisi-
tion in an individualistic society than in a collectivistic society. Such
material acquisitiveness provides an incentive to adjudicators to solicit
or at least accept bribes, which incentive is relatively lacking in most
collectivistically organized societies.
These hypotheses, findings, and theories relating to collectivistic
and individualistic societies, like those relating to manufacturing and
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are not based on sufficient data to merit acceptance as proven proposi-
tions. This exploratory study, however, is readily capable of being
expanded into a research design using more societies, more informa-
tion sources, and more variables. It has been a success to the extent
that it throws light on the relationships involved and to the extent that
it provokes more expansive studies of the cross-cultural context of
adjudicative and other legal processes.

